Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

The State of Utah v. David Craig Carlsen : Petition
for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald G. Linton; Logan City Prosecutor; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
David Craig Carlsen; Appelant in pro se.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Carlsen, No. 940450 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6104

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940450-CA

-vs-

Case Type: APPEAL
Priority No. 2

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE
ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN, JUDGE PRESIDING

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
Telephone: (801) 752-8162

a. WcH^O

Appellant in Pro Se

DONALD G. LINTON
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 750-9807
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
AUb 8 - 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE ITT Ml tCMIRT OF APPEAL^
,".T ' \TE OF UTAHr

Plaintiff/Appel1e e ,

Case No. n 104 5C-CA

-vs-

Casp ^vno.

APPEAL

I

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant/Appel 1 ant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE
ALFRED C VAN WAGENEN, JUDGE PRESTPTVG

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 8 4 3, ; -." :48
T e l e p h o n e : (801- "-•; 8162
1
D 0 N A L D G. LINTON
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
L o g a n , Utah 84321
T e l e p h o n e : (801 ^ "'^^-QR07

Attorney for

TABLE OF CONTENTS
e
DISCUSSION:
Point 1: This Court overlooked or misapprehended
the substantial impact of the numerous errors in
the trial court's written judgment and sentence . . .

1-

Point 2: This Court overlooked or misapprehended
the lack of any statutory or other authority on
the part of the trial court to set aside the jury
verdict for the offense of Assault upon a Peace
Officer and entering Judgment and imposing
Sentence for the offense of Simple Assault

4-

CONCLUSION

6

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

7

ADDENDUM

8

Written Judgment and Sentence

9-

Order Denying Motion to Correct Sentence

11

Memorandum Decision

12

Statutes

14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES CITED;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), (1953 as amended)

4-

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18a-l, (1953 as amended)

6

RULES CITED:
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

6
1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1990) . . .

2

State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982)

5

State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)

5

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

5

State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993)

6

State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988)

3

-ii-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]i

Case No. 940450-CA

-vs-

])

Case Type: APPEAL

]1

Priority No. 2

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

]

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Defendant/Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, pursuant to
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, does hereby
respectfully submits the following Petition for Rehearing.
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light
of the following points and issues:
Point 1.

This Court overlooked or misapprehended the

substantial impact of the numerous errors in the trial court's
written Judgment and Sentence.
Point 2.

This Court overlooked or misapprehended the lack

of any statutory or other authority on the part of the trial
court to set aside the conviction for the offense of Assault
upon a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and imposing Sentence
for the offense of Simple Assault.
DISCUSSION OF POINT I
Point 1.

This Court overlooked or misapprehended the
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substantial impact of the numerous errors in the trial court's
written Judgment and Sentence.
This Court in State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah App.
1990) at 797 P.2d 1115 observed:
At common law, the judgment in a criminal case was
usually nothing more than the oral declaration of guilt
and sentence, pronounced while a clerk took notes. The
practice of rendering oral judgments in criminal cases
has persisted to this day in many courts, including
apparently many of the Utah circuit courts, despite
sound reasons opposing its continuation. Those reasons
include the following: (1) entry of a time-stamped,
written judgment fixes clearly on the record the date of
the judgment, thereby simplifying the question of when
the time begins to run for post-trial motions, filing
notice of appeal, and for any probation ordered; (2) a
written in proper form is clear evidence of the defendant's
conviction in later proceedings; (3) a written judgment
signed by the judge helps assure the absence of clerical
error or misunderstanding in the record and shows that
responsibility for the judgments rests on the shoulders
of the judge; and (4) it provides at least the beginning
of a basis for meaningful review of the judgment.
The written Judgment and Sentence in the instant case was
signed by Circuit Court Judge, Alfred C. Van Wagenen after this
Court's decision in Anderson.

Anderson, clearly places any

errors in the written Judgment upon the shoulders of the trial
judge who signs the Judgment.

The written Judgment and Sentence

in the instant case under this Court's decision in Anderson is
clear evidence of the four convictions which the written judgment
shows in any subsequent proceedings against the Defendant where
a jury, being citizens of ordinary intelligence in reviewing the
written Judgment and Sentence would in fact conclude that the
Defendant had been convicted of one count of Simple Assault;
one count of Assault upon a Peace Officer; and two counts of

-2-

Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer.

The written

Judgment and Sentence in the instant case does not show that
the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer was reduced by the
Court to the offense of Simple Assault as represented by the
Logan City Prosecutor in his Brief before this Court.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d
1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) observed:
The trial court may correct clerical mistakes in
judgments at any time, with or without notice as the
court may order. Utah R.Crim.P. 30(b). A clerical
error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, is
not "the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial
reasoning and determination."
The written Judgment and Sentence in this case was signed
by Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen, who thereafter refused to
correct the errors in the written Judgment by denying the
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentences in the written
Judgment.

The errors in the written Judgment in this case are

not clerical errors, but judicial errors because the errors are
the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning
and deliberation by Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen signing the
written Judgment and thereafter refusing to correct the
errors in the written judgment.
The written Judgment does impose illegal sentences or
sentences imposed in an illegal manner because the written
Judgment imposes sentences for offenses of which there was a
total lack of any prior notice and hearing, and the trial court
did error in denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct the
Sentence under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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DISCUSSION OF POINT II.
Point 2. This Court overlooked or misapprehended the
lack of any statutory or other authority on the part of the
trial court to set aside the jury verdict for the offense
of Assault upon a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and
imposing Sentence for the offense of Simple Assault.
The Defendant contends that this Court overlooked or
misapprehended that the Circuit Court is a statutory created
court which lacked any statutory authority or other authority
to set aside the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon
a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and imposing Sentence
for the offense of Simple Assault.
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5),
(1974 Amendment) provides as follows:
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari,
shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for the offense charged but that
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily
found every fact required for conviction of that included
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set
aside or reversed an a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial,
if such relief is sought by the defendant.
"Emphasis Added."
The statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)
specifically confers authority upon the district court and
appellate courts of the State of Utah, jurisdiction to invoke
the provisions of that statute and to set aside a conviction and
to enter judgment of an included offense.
The statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)
does not confer any authority or jurisdiction upon any Circuit
Court or Justice Court Judge, any authority to set aside a
conviction for one offense and to enter judgment for an included
-4-

offense.
The Utah Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Bindrup,
655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); and State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d
1214 (Utah 1985) where the statutory provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) was invoked did involve felony murder cases
on appeal from the District Courts of the State of Utah and not
an appeal from a Circuit Court.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Dunn/ 850
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) involved the issue of the inherent power
of the Utah Supreme Court, a Constitutionally created court to
set aside a conviction for error and to enter a judgment of guilt
to a lesser included offense.

The case did not involve the

power of a Circuit Court/ a statutory created court to set aside
a conviction for one offense and to enter judgment to a lesser
offense.
Secondly, the trial court in the instant case did not invoke
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) when the Court
set aside the conviction for the offense of Assault upon a Peace
Officer and entered judgment and imposed sentence for the offense
of Simple Assault/ and such relief was not sought by the defendant
as is clearly evident by the Sentencing Transcript.
The State concedes in its brief before this Court that the
trial judge in this case lacked such authority.
The trial court setting aside the Defendant's conviction and
the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer
on grounds that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
-5-

to sustain the conviction for the offense as charged in the
Information which constitutes an acquittal.

State v. Jackson/

857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court
setting aside the jury verdict in this case for the offense
of Assault upon a Peace Officer on grounds of insufficient
evidence adduced at trial constitutes an arrest in judgment
under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

It would

be the State who has failed to appeal from the Order Arresting
Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18a-l(2)(b), (1990 Amendment), and not the Defendant's
failure to appeal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, it would appear that this
Honorable Court may have overlooked or misapprehended the
substantial issues raised by the Defendant/Appellant in his
Brief on Appeal.

The Defendant respectfully submits that the

granting of this petition seem compelling in light of the
foregoing.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this ZJ

day of August, 1995.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSE]^
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The Defendant/Appellant certifies that this Petition is
submitted in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

-7,
^

^

DATED this O

day of August, 1995,
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN ^ ^
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the
roing PETITION FOR REHEARING, postage prep;
foregoing
prepaid to the following
listed below on this

n

day of August, 1995:

Donald G. Linton
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
D CRAIG CARLSEN (/
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FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
VS

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG
316 S. MAIN
LOGAN
UT

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:

84321

911000628
03/05/49
91457 COUNT: 1
11/15/91

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE ASLT
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: "Guilty - Jury
Fine:
1075.00
Susp:
700.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp: 180 DA

ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF IN ARREST BY P/O
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
1075.00
Susp:
700.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp: 180 DA

ACS:

0

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: FINE,FEE,FORF.-STATE
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

750.00

0.00

Due:

750.00

PROBATION AGENCIES;
Agency Name:
Agency Address:
Agency Address:
City/State/Zip:
Phone:

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
140 NORTH 100 WEST
LOGAN
(801) 752-6893

UT 84321

PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS:
VIOLATE NO LAWS
DEF ON INFORMAL COURT PROBATION
DEF TO PAY FINES @ RATE OF $100/MO BEGIN 12/5
CALENDAR;
SENTENCING

11/15/91 01:30 PM in rm 2 with CLINT S JUDKINS

CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG

CASE NO: 911000 628

PAGE

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Sentence:
Deft present w/o Counsel, Prosecutor present
PRO: SCOTT WYATT
TAPE: 91457
COUNT: 1
Judge:
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Chrg: ASLT ON P.O.
1075.00
Suspended:
700.00
Fine Amount:
Suspended: 180 DAYS
Jail:
180 DAYS
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Chrg: INTERF ARREST PO
Fine Amount:
1075.00
Suspended:
700.00
Jail:
180 DAYS
Suspended: 180 DAYS

BY THE COURT

'cu.. ilk

*&£rl

CIRCUIT COURT
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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LOGAN DISTRICT
JUL

12 2 26 Pfl 'S'j

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
Telephone: (801) 752-8162
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

Case No. 911000628
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter coming on for hearing in this
Court on the 10th day of May, 1994 on Defendant's Motion to Correct
the Sentence.

The Plaintiff appearing and being represented by

Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt. The Defendant appearing in
person and not represented by counsel.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED for good cause appearing that the
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment
previously signed by this Court is hereby denied.

DATED this

#

.day of

1994

FILED
JUL 1 3 1995
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 940450-CA

David Craig Carlsen,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
( J u l y 1 3 , 1995)

First Circuit, Logan Department
The Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen
Attorneys:

David Craig Carlsen, Logan, Appellant Pro Se
Donald G. Linton, Logan, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant David Craig Carlsen appeals from the denial of a
motion to correct sentence.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury
of assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995) and interference
with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995).2 The trial court set aside the
jury verdict of assault on a peace officer and entered a
conviction for assault. The court ruled as a matter of law that
the officer "was not acting within the scope of his authority as
a peace officer at the time he was assaulted by the defendant."
The trial court concluded that the jury had found all of the
necessary elements of assault, a lesser included offense.
1. Appellants appeal from the underlying conviction (Case No.
920305-CA) was dismissed for failure to prosecute. This appeal
is taken from the order denying defendant's motion to correct
sentence entered by the trial court on July 19, 1994.
2. Appellant also contends that a discrepancy in the description
of his convictions within the judgment of conviction rendered the
sentence illegal. The error is a mere clerical error and does
not render the sentence illegal.

A trial court can correct an illegal sentence at any time.
State v. Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991). "Once a
court imposes u valid sentence, it loses subject matter
jurisdiction over the case." Id* Our inquiry is thus limited to
determining whether the trial court legally sentenced appellant
and thus correctly denied the motion to correct illegal sentence.
The trial court characterized its sentencing decision as a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellant contends that Rule 50
conflicts with Rule 2 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal under the
latter rule. We disagree. Regardless of how the trial court
characterized its decision, the determination actually resulted
in an arrest of the jury's verdict. "[A] trial court may arrest
a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element."
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The trial court
concluded that the evidertc'e was insufficient to prove only the
element that the assault occurred at a time when the officer was
acting within the scope of his authority. The jury was
instructed on the elements of assault on a peace officer and
assault and was also instructed that assault was a lesser
included offense. The sentence for the lesser included offense
was not an illegal sentence. We affirm the denial of the motion
to correct illegal sentence.
Appellant's contention that the court's sentence denied him
the opportunity to raise defenses unavailable under State v.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) is without merit since that
case involved a charge of interference with a police officer
seeking to effect an arrest. The jury verdict on that offense
was unaffected by the trial court's decision.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Ndrman H. Jackscjyf, Judge

940450-CA

2

76-1-402, Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
t h p r p i r r nr

GENERAL PROVISIONS

76-1-402

(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2.
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating

another statute, § 76-6-704.
Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const.,
Amend. V; § 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Act."
Instructions.
Jurisdiction of appellate court.
—Judgment Entered for included offense.
Jurisdiction of a single court.
Lesser included offense.
—Aggravated assault.
—Aggravated robbery.
—Joy riding.
—Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide.
—Possession of stolen vehicle.

—Theft.
Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Multiple predicate offenses.
Separate offenses.
—Attempted homicide.
—Automobile violations.
— Burglary and larceny.
— Burglary and theft.
—Felonv murder.

ecution has met its burden of proof on the
elements of the greater offense and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense;
however, if there be any evidence, however
slight, on any reasonable theory of the case
under which defendant might be convicted of
the lesser included offense, the trial court must,
if requested, give an appropriate instruction on
the lesser included offense. State v. Chesnut,
621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
Trial court may give a lesser included offense
instruction, even over a defendant's objection, if
warranted by the evidence and if there is
clearly no risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation so as to
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to
defend himself State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91
(Utah 1982]
Although lesser offense must be necessarily
included within charged offense in order to
warrant prosecutor's request for lesser included offense instructions, a National basis"
• A P * »f o i l t n o t i c r o n n i raA

iirVinr* i r» c 11-11 •»+i/-»n I C ai

77-18a-l

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
Section
77-18a-1.
77-18a-2.

Appeals — When proper.
Capital cases.

77-18a-1. Appeals — When proper,
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review th§ appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l. enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 10.
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases
construing that rule, see the Court Rules volume.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12
makes the act effective on July 1, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general.
Arrest of judgment.
Dismissal.
In general.
To determine whether an appeal falls within
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate
court looks to the substance of the ruling and
not to the label attached by a trial judge. State
v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)
°
Arrest of judgment
A trial court's ruling was an arrest of judgment and not an acquittal where the trial court
found that the facts proved did not constitute a

crime because the defendant, a general partner, could not have committed theft by taking
partnership property. Although the trial
court's order was also labeled an acquittal, the
order was not based on a finding of insufficient
evidence. Thus, the state had a right to appeal.
State v. Larsen, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct.
App. 1992).
"Dismissal "
, ir ,
' . ,
.,
When a ™otion to suppress evidence is re0
cl Sm g
" ^ f ^ ™ !
° f . "V™*** a n d l s
granted, the order granting the motion is an
acquittal and not a "dismissal" as that term is
used in this section and Utah R. Crim. P.
26(3)(a), and is not subject to appeal by the
state. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct.
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